In the early years of the American Civil War, a peddler walked into a Union camp with a case of watches. Museum accounts of these watches describe what followed: roving merchants sold thousands of cheap watches to eager customers in wartime encampments, and a model called the William ElleryWilliam Ellery gradeWaltham's low-priced grade, introduced in 1861 and marketed heavily to soldiers. By 1865 it made up almost 45 percent of the company's unit sales., at a headline price of $13, became a fad among Union soldiers. By 1865 it made up almost 45 percent of the unit sales of the company that built it, the American Watch Company of Waltham, Massachusetts.

Realistic illustration of a travelling peddler opening a case of pocket watches for curious Union soldiers at a Civil War encampment at dusk.
In the same years the government paid about $14.93 to make a Springfield rifle-musketSpringfield rifle-musketThe standard muzzle-loading infantry rifle of the Union Army, made at Springfield Armory and by private contractors., a weapon with 84 pieces, all of them interchangeableInterchangeable partsParts made so exactly alike that any one fits any other assembly of the same model, without hand fitting.. A watch of the period had more than 160 miniature moving pieces and sold for about the same money. The two figures are not strictly comparable, since one is a manufacturing cost and the other a selling price, but the point survives: a rifle built to fire and a watch built to count came from the same idea, and the way that idea crossed from a rifle factory to a watch factory, and then to Switzerland, explains more about the modern watch industry than any single brand.
The idea was older than the war. George WashingtonGeorge WashingtonFirst president of the United States and commander of the Continental Army. His concern over standardizing rifles led to the national armory at Springfield.'s concern over standardizing rifles for the Continental Army led to the national armory at Springfield, MassachusettsSpringfield ArmoryThe US national armory at Springfield, Massachusetts, completed in 1794. Its production methods became a model for American manufacturing., completed in 1794. Colonel Roswell LeeRoswell LeeSuperintendent of Springfield Armory from 1815, who introduced modern management and accounting., superintendent from 1815, introduced modern management and accounting. In 1819 the engineer Thomas BlanchardThomas BlanchardAmerican inventor whose 1819 lathe could copy the irregular shape of a gun stock, work that craftsmen had carved by hand. developed a lathe that could duplicate the irregular shape of a gun stock, work that craftsmen had carved by hand. Thomas WarnerThomas WarnerSpringfield armorer credited with making interchangeable-part production possible. is credited with making interchangeable part production possible, and Cyrus BucklandCyrus BucklandSpringfield armorer who developed a precise set of gauges that contributed to manufacturing standards. developed a precise set of gauges that contributed to manufacturing standards. By the 1840s, one account says, the armory had achieved its goal. The National Park Service puts the result in a sentence: a trigger from one musket would fit any other musket of the same model.

Realistic illustration of a national armory workshop in the early nineteenth century: rows of identical lock plates along a long bench, and a lathe shaping gun stocks on the right in the manner of Blanchard's machine.
Aaron DennisonAaron DennisonWatch repairer from Maine, working in Boston, who tried to apply the armory's methods to watchmaking. He was superintendent of the Waltham company until 1862. was a watch repairman from Maine, working in Boston, who spent his evenings wondering whether the armory's logic could be applied to something far smaller. He later recounted that the idea came from what he saw at Springfield, and the museum historian Amy GreenAmy GreenMuseum historian whose writing on the American watch industry is cited here for Dennison's visits to the armory. writes that he was a regular observer at the armory. In 1850 he joined the clockmaker Edward Howard and David DavisEdward Howard and David DavisPartners in the Howard and Davis clock business in Roxbury, Massachusetts. Aaron Dennison joined them in 1850 to start the watch venture. in Roxbury, and in 1854 the company moved to Waltham, onto a tract of nearly 100 acres (about 40 hectares) beside the Charles River.

Realistic illustration of a young watch repairer at his bench by oil lamp, a pocket watch movement under his hands and a small pistol on a cloth beside him, evoking Aaron Dennison weighing the armory's methods against his own trade.
The first results were humbling. A watch is not a rifle: the parts are smaller, the tolerances finer, and museum historians are frank that it would be well into the twentieth century before the watch industry achieved a very high level of interchangeability. The Charles River Museum adds that early Waltham parts were not always interchangeable and that each watch had its own errors to correct. A remark preserved in watch histories says that by 1857 Waltham knew how to make a good lever watch for $20, but that it had cost $150,000 to find out how. The money ran out the same year. The company went bankrupt in the Panic of 1857Panic of 1857A US financial crisis in 1857 that brought bank failures and business bankruptcies, including that of the watch company., and a New York watch importer, Royal RobbinsRoyal RobbinsNew York watch importer who bought the bankrupt company in 1857 and kept Aaron Dennison on as superintendent until 1862., bought it and kept Dennison on as superintendent until 1862.
The armory arrived in person, too, if the author Aaron StarkAaron StarkAuthor and former West Point economics professor whose 2022 research on Waltham is a main source for this post., a former West Point economics professor, is right. He argues that Ambrose WebsterAmbrose WebsterPer Aaron Stark's research, a mechanic who began his career at Springfield Armory and became Waltham's chief mechanic and principal inventor of its machines. Not confirmed independently., who began his career at Springfield Armory, became Waltham's chief mechanic and principal inventor of its machines, and that his automation let the company employ semi-skilled workers who knew little about watchmaking. If so, it is the missing step between a company that spent $150,000 learning to make a $20 lever watch and one that could sell the $13 Ellery by the thousands. We have not found independent confirmation of Webster's start at the armory, so treat it as Stark's account.

Realistic illustration of the red-brick factory of the American Watch Company on the bank of the Charles River at Waltham, with morning mist on the water and a horse-drawn wagon on the road, mid-nineteenth century.
Then the war arrived, and it rescued a company that was close to collapse. Sales fell when it began, as they do when a country goes to war, but soldiers wanted a reasonably priced timepiece, and Waltham was ready for them. According to a collector's history drawing on the company historian Charles MooreCharles MooreHistorian of the Waltham company, author of Timing a Century (1945), a history of Waltham., the William Ellery grade appeared between May and October 1861 and was marketed heavily to soldiers. By 1865 it also accounted for about 30 percent of Waltham's profits. A collector's serial table, which we could not check against Waltham's own records, has Waltham's serial numbers climbing from about 30,000 in 1861 to about 180,000 in 1865.

Realistic illustration, in the manner of a period tintype portrait, of a young Union soldier holding out an open hunter-case pocket watch on its chain.
Why would a soldier spend that much? A private earned $13 a month in 1861, rising to $16 in June 1864. The $13 was the price of the Ellery movement alone, a month's pay before a case was added, and a finished watch in its case cost more: Stark estimates about two months of a private's pay. He argues that soldiers bought it anyway. There were few clocks in the field, synchronization mattered in battle, and a watch is a tool a soldier can carry that also says something about him. Millions of men went home with the habit. Stark writes that in 1870 about one in twenty American adults owned a watch, and by 1900 about one in five, a rise he ties in part to the soldiers who took the habit home.

Realistic illustration of a percussion rifle lock with its screws and springs laid out beside a pocket watch movement on green felt, a rifle-musket behind them: two products of the same interchangeable-parts idea.
The rifle makers were busy too. By HistoryNet's count, Springfield Armory produced 793,434 Model 1861 rifle-musketsModel 1861 rifle-musketThe main infantry weapon of the Union Army in the Civil War, first made in 1861. between 1861 and 1865 and private contractors another 882,561, all with interchangeable parts. The same logic that armed an army was putting a watch in its pockets.
Fifteen years later the idea came back across the Atlantic as a warning. In the summer of 1876 the United States held a Centennial ExhibitionCentennial Exhibition, 1876The world's fair held in Philadelphia in 1876 to mark a hundred years of American independence. in Philadelphia, and a delegation from the Swiss watch industry saw what the American system had produced. Among them was Jacques DavidJacques DavidTechnical director of Longines. After the 1876 exhibition he toured American watch factories and wrote a confidential report urging the Swiss to mechanize., technical director of Longines, who stayed on after the exhibition to tour American factories with the watchmaker Théodore GribiThéodore GribiSwiss watchmaker who toured American factories with Jacques David in 1876 and concluded that the Swiss had been left behind., on behalf of the Société intercantonale des industries du Jura. His report concentrates on the American Watch Company at Waltham and the Elgin National Watch Company, the same Elgin whose observatory we described in an earlier piece. David was struck by the level of mechanization and automation, and his report concluded that the Swiss had to adopt American methods if they did not want to be left behind.

Realistic illustration of two Swiss visitors in top hats watching an operator at an automatic screw machine in a large American factory hall, evoking the 1876 tour of Jacques David and Théodore Gribi.
Here the armory's idea showed up in its purest form: interchangeable parts need machines that cut every part the same way, over and over. The machine that unsettled the visitors most was a small one. Charles River Museum figures say an operator could tend half a dozen or more of Waltham's automatic screw machines and turn out fifty to sixty thousand screws a day, where a watchmaker with an assistant might make up to fifteen hundred by hand. The Swiss were not naive about it. Longines itself had already begun to mechanize, and in 1865 Ernest FrancillonErnest FrancillonFounder and head of Longines in Saint-Imier. In 1865 he told his uncle he wanted a factory built around machines like the American ones., the head of Longines, had told his uncle he wanted a factory built around machines like the American ones. The visit gave the movement an argument. Gribi, as Richard WatkinsRichard WatkinsWriter on watch history, quoted here for Théodore Gribi's conclusion after the 1876 tour. quotes him, drew the same conclusion: the Swiss had been left behind by their competitors in the New World.
David's confidential report on the tour was too sensitive to publish. Because the Swiss feared that the Americans would stop cooperating, or read it as industrial sabotage, it was kept from the press and the public, only a few handwritten copies were made, and it stayed unpublished for 115 years until Longines issued a facsimile in 1992. Aaron Stark goes further. He argues that David had an inside source at Waltham, a former assistant superintendent who appears as Mr W in David's letters, and he identifies him as Ambrose Webster, the same mechanic. That is Stark's research, published in 2022, and we have not found it confirmed elsewhere.

Realistic illustration of a handwritten report with machine sketches lying on a desk beside an open pocket watch, an inkwell, an oil lamp and a Philadelphia newspaper, evoking Jacques David's confidential report on the American factories.
The Swiss took the lesson. Within a generation the Jura valleys had machines of their own, and by the early twentieth century Switzerland was a far more serious competitor than the one David had warned about. They kept the machines but held on to the variety and diversity that set Swiss watches apart from uniform American production. The roles had reversed. American makers now asked for tariffs, smugglers carried Swiss watches across the American border, and in the 1930s the Swiss state wrote a law to stop Swiss parts and tools from helping foreign competitors learn what the Swiss had once learned at Waltham.
Pierre-Yves DonzéPierre-Yves DonzéSwiss business historian who has written extensively on the history of the Swiss watch industry, including its cartel and its transfer of technology to rivals., the leading historian of the Swiss industry, argues that the Swiss cartel set up in the interwar years aimed both to protect the industrial district and to control technology transfer, a transfer that had helped rivals in the United States and Japan. Seen from Waltham, it is a neat symmetry. A rifle factory taught a watch factory, the watch factory taught the Swiss, and the Swiss spent much of the twentieth century trying to stop teaching anyone else.

Realistic illustration of a mechanized watch factory in the Swiss Jura, with rows of belt-driven machines, workers along a central aisle and an alpine landscape visible through the far window.
A short, practical note for collectors
Our reading as dealers is this. The William Ellery is a watch built for ordinary buyers, and that is part of its charm. It was made in the Model 1857 full-plate and Model 1859 three-quarter-plate designs, and one collector site describes the Ellery that Abraham LincolnAbraham Lincoln16th president of the United States, in office from 1861 to 1865. That he carried a William Ellery watch is an unverified claim. is said to have carried as an 11-jewel, 18-size, key-wind movement in a silver hunter case made in 1863. We have not verified the Lincoln link and would not repeat it as fact. A price list for movements alone in 1865, reproduced by a collector, shows the range of the lineup: $13 for the Ellery, $16 for the P.S. Bartlett, $38 for the Appleton Tracy grade and $175 for the top American Watch grade.
The interchangeability story has a practical side. One watch-history site notes that American factories intended from the outset to supply spare parts to watch repairers, which is one reason many period parts still exist. That said, the Charles River Museum reminds us that early parts did not always fit, so a repair may still need hand fitting. Use the serial number to date the movement, and keep in mind that Waltham used grade names such as Ellery, Bartlett and Appleton Tracy to mark the level of finish.
Be careful with Civil War provenance. A movement alone rarely proves where a watch was carried, and the author Clint GellerClint GellerAuthor of a book on authenticating Civil War timepieces. has written a whole book on authenticating Civil War timepieces. Ask for documents, a soldier's name or a period photograph, not just a story.

Realistic illustration of an open silver hunter-case Civil War era pocket watch lying on a grey wool blanket beside a folded letter.
Where the sources disagree
The founding of the company is dated 1849 by one museum account, which says it was launched in a corner of the Howard and Davis clock factory in Roxbury, and 1850 by most other sources. The share of Waltham's 1865 sales taken by the Ellery appears as 44.6, 44.7 and almost 45 percent. The Ellery's $13 price appears as the price of a watch in one museum's description and as the price of the movement without a case in the Charles River Museum text and in an 1865 list reproduced by a collector. We follow the second reading, so the comparison with the $14.93 rifle is approximate and a finished watch cost more. The output of Model 1861 rifle-muskets also varies by source: HistoryNet gives 793,434 from Springfield Armory and 882,561 from private contractors for 1861 to 1865, about 1.68 million in all, while other references put the total at a little over one million and the armory's own output at 265,129 for 1861 to 1863, so the production figures above are approximate. The length of David's report is given as 108 pages in one account and 130 in another, and the reason it was withheld is given as fear that the Americans would stop cooperating in one and fear that they would read it as industrial sabotage in another. Dennison's inspiration at Springfield rests on his own later recollection, which historians repeat. Ambrose Webster's start at the armory and his role as David's informant rest on Stark's research alone. Several popular histories say Waltham stopped production when the war began, while others describe reduced output, and we have not tried to settle it. Finally, museum sources are clear that watch interchangeability was far from perfect for decades.